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The decade ending in 1940 witnessed more rapid progress in bridge
building, as measured by lengthening spans, boldness of proportions, and
increasing magnitude of projects, than all the centuries preceding. It
took 40 years (1889 to 1929) to increase the world’s record span length
from 1700 ft. (Forth Bridge) to 1850 ft. (Ambassador Bridge at
D etroit); and then, in the next eight years (1929 to 1937), in two
leaps (George Washington Bridge and Golden Gate Bridge), the
record span length was more than doubled, from 1850 ft. to 4200 ft.
The five longest spans in the world were all completed during this
decade (Golden Gate, 4200 ft.; George Washington, 3500 ft.; Tacoma
Narrows, 2800 ft.; Transbay, 2310 ft.; Bronx-Whitestone, 2300 ft.)
The largest bridge project in history, the Transbay Bridge between
San Francisco and Oakland, 8 miles long, costing $77,200,000, was
completed in 1936. A record foundation depth of 240 ft. was reached
for one of the piers. A bridge project of still greater aggregate magni
tude, the “T o r der W elt” over the Elbe River and Elbe Canal at Ham 
burg, to involve 500,000 tons of steel and to include a 2296-ft. suspen
sion span and a record-breaking plate girder of 854 ft. span, was started
in 1938 but construction was suspended at the outbreak of the war in
1939.' The decade witnessed new records of span length achieved in
steel arches, continuous trusses, vertical lift bridges, bascule bridges,
and concrete arches, in addition to the five new record-breaking span?
of the suspension type.
When progress is rapid—too rapidly accelerated—we may expect
new problems to be discovered, sometimes with the impact of catas
trophe.
On July 1, 1940, the Tacoma Narrows Bridge at Puget Sound was
completed and opened to traffic. Built at a cost of $6,400,000, with a
main span of 2800 feet, it was the third longest span in the world. On
November 7, 1940, four months and six days after the official opening,
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the oscillations of the bridge in a gale increased to destructive amplitude
until the main span broke up, ripping loose from the cables and crash
ing into the waters of Puget Sound.
The cause of the catastrophe was soon recognized by the profession.
It was a combination of two factors which were more marked in the
design of the Tacoma span than in any other modern bridge. One was
extreme flexibility of the span; and the other was a peculiar character
istic of the cross-section, that may best briefly be described as "aero
dynamic instability ” The combination of the two, unless corrected,
may spell disaster.
The Tacoma Narrows bridge was by far the most flexible of all
modern suspension bridges. Whereas authorities had formerly recom
mended for suspension bridges a minimum width of 1/30 of the span,
the width center to center of cables of the Tacoma Bridge was only
39 feet, or 1/72 of the span. It looked like a slender ribbon from bank
to bank. This lateral flexibility of the bridge, however, was not a factor
in the failure. Although the bridge was calculated to have a theoretical
maximum lateral deflection of 21 feet at full wind pressure, its actual
maximum lateral deflection at mid-span never exceeded four feet, even
during the gale which destroyed it.
W hat proved critical, however, was the vertical slenderness of the
span. A generation earlier, authorities had recommended for the stiffen
ing trusses of suspension bridges a minimum depth of 1/ 40th of the
span, and this recommendation of minimum depth-ratio had later been
reduced to l/9 0 th to 1/150th for spans between 2,000 and 3,000 feet.
The stiffening girders of the Tacoma Bridge were made only eight feet
deep in a span of 2800 feet, or only 1/350th of the span! The resulting
extreme vertical flexibility was a factor in the failure. High flexible
towers and long suspended side spans added to the flexibility of the
design, and a fatal coincidence of natural oscillation periods of towers
and spans aggravated the susceptibility of the structure to the setting up
of harmonic motions of dangerous magnitude.
The other factor was the newly discovered phenomenon called aero
dynamic instability. The Tacoma Bridge had solid-web plate girders,
and when a solid bridge floor is framed into the solid webs of such plate
girders, the resulting cross-section is peculiarly sensitive to aerodynamic
effects, even in a steady wind, particularly if the span is highly flexible.
Once any small undulation of the bridge is started, the resultant effect
of a wind nearly horizontal tends to cause a building up of the vertical
undulations to a higher amplitude; and, if adequate restraining or cor
rective measures have not been provided, there is then a tendency for
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the undulations to change into a twisting motion, with further progres
sive increase of amplitude until these torsional oscillations reach dan
gerous or destructive proportions. The small initial undulations may be
started by the longitudinal component of a quartering wind acting on
the highly arched span like an aerofoil or airplane wing to produce lift
by pressure or suction, or it may be started by the “von Karman vortex
effect” producing a periodic flutter, like the “singing” of telephone wires
in a wind. The ensuing building up of the undulations is explained by
the “den Hartog effect”, like the violent periodic “dancing” of hightension transmission lines when they are coated with ice to form a ver
tically elongated surface. The subsequent change from vertical undula
tions to the catastrophic torsional oscillations of increasing magnitude
may also be predicted by an extension of the theory of the “den Hartog
effect”. The entire action can be demonstrated by mathematical analysis
and by simple wind-actuated models.
From the slender proportions and the characteristics of the crosssection, trouble was anticipated by bridge engineers as soon as the design
of the Tacoma span was announced. Even before the bridge was com
pleted, when the forms were placed for concreting the roadway, the
motions of the span were so violent that the bridgemen working on the
steelwork became seasick.
From the day of its opening, the peculiar motions of the span at
tracted attention and it soon was locally nicknamed “Galloping Gertie”.
The story is told, strange as it may seem, that traffic on the bridge
trebled as a result of its novel behavior, and people came hundreds of
miles in their cars to enjoy the curious thrill of riding over a bounding,
galloping roller-coaster. For four months the bridge did a thriving
business, and apparently the authorities in charge were daily becoming
more confident of the safety of the structure. It is even reported that
the bridge officials were planning a week later to cancel the insurance
policies on the bridge in order to save on the premiums by taking out
new insurance in reduced amount.
During the four months of service, the vertical undulations of the
bridge, produced by wind action, never exceeded a maximum of five feet.
Movements of high amplitude were observed when the wind was blow
ing as little as four miles per hour.
From about 7 A. M. on the morning of November 7, 1940, the
bridge had been persistently undulating for some three hours. A wind
of 35 to 42 miles per hour was blowing, and the waters of Puget Sound
were whipped into whitecaps. The segments of the span were heaving
periodically up and down as much as three feet, with a frequency of
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about 36 cycles per minute. Alarmed at the persistent character of the
wave motion in the span, the highway authorities stopped traffic over
the structure. At 10 A. M., the last truck was passing over the span,
when something seemed to snap and, suddenly, the character of the
motion changed. The rhythmic rise and fall changed to a two-wave
twisting motion, with the two sides out of phase. The main span was
oscillating in two segments, with nodes at mid-span. As two diagonally
opposite quarter-points were going up, the other two diagonally opposite
quarter-points were going down. The frequency was 14 cycles per
minute and, soon after, changed to 12 cycles per minute. W ith each
successive cycle, the motion was becoming greater, until it had increased
from three feet to 28 feet! At one moment, one edge of the roadway
was 28 feet higher than the other; the next moment it was 28 feet
lower than the other edge. The roadway was tilted 45 degrees from
the horizontal one way, and then 45 degrees the other way. Lamp
standards in one half of the span made an angle of 90 degrees with
lamp standards in the other half. Fortunately, some amateur photog
raphers were at the scene with motion picture cameras, and they have
supplied us with a unique and unprecedented record of the action of
the span in its dance of death. The motion pictures of the twisting
span are unforgettable and the distortions they depict, in character and
magnitude, are almost unbelievable. The span twists in gigantic waves,
and it is difficult to realize that the girders were made, not of rubber,
but of structural steel having a modulus of elacticity of 29,000,000
pounds per square inch. For a half-hour and more, the steelwork and
the concrete slab took this terrific punishment. Something was bound
to give way. At 10:30 came the first break: one floor panel at mid-span
broke out and dropped into the water 208 feet below. The twisting,
writhing motion continued. Spectators on the shores were herded to a
safer distance away from the span. At 11 A. M. the real breaking up
of the span occurred; 600 feet of the main span near the west quarterpoint tore away from the suspenders, the girders ripping away from the
floor like a zipper; part of the falling bridge floor turned upside-down
before the entire falling mass hit the water, sending up spray to a great
height. W ith a 600-ft. section of the bridge gone, the engineers of the
bridge structure expected the motion to subside. But the heaving and
twisting of the rest of the bridge continued, with the side spans now
participating in the motions. Finally, at 11:10 A. M., nearly all the
rest of the main span tore loose, and came crashing down. The 1100foot side spans, now deprived of the counterbalancing weight of the
main span, suddenly deflected about 60 feet, striking the approach
parapet; then bounced up with an elastic rebound, only to drop again
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with a final sag of about 30 feet. This was the final gigantic convulsion
in the death struggle of a great bridge.
The torn, tangled, twisted stub ends of steelwork sticking out from
the towers were all that was left of the main span. It was a tragic,
heart-rending spectacle— the helpless mutilated wreck of a great and
beautiful structure. Into it men had built their faith and their hopes,
only to have these shattered. Once more the elemental forces of Nature
had conquered— but such victories are only temporary. After each such
set-back, M an proceeds with more perfected knowledge, with greater
resourcefulness, and with strengthened resolve, to strive again, to plan
again, to build again, to achieve again— all toward renewed triumph
and more enduring mastery over the obstacles and destructive forces of
Nature.
Only one car was on the span at the time of the failure. It belonged
to a newspaper reporter who had to abandon the car and its sole
remaining occupant, a pet dog, when the span began its violent twisting
motion. Crawling on hands and knees, and desperately clutching the
curb, the reporter slowly and painfully made his way along the heaving
span until, torn and bleeding, he finally reached safety. His dog went
down with the car and the span— the only life lost in the disaster.
About a year earlier, recognizing the unusual proportions of the
span, the authorities had appropriated $20,000 for dynamic model tests.
These were under the direction of Professor F. B. Farquharson at the
University of Washington at Seattle. The scale model was actuated not
by wind but by electric solenoids, with circuit controls arranged to
produce different modes of harmonic motion. Professor Farquharson
succeeded in getting the laboratory model to duplicate all of the known
modes of undulation of the bridge, with the main span moving up and
down in one segment, two segments, and so on up to nine segments.
The one type of motion that finally caused the failure of the structure,
namely the twisting motion was, however, entirely unanticipated in
these experiments. On the morning of the failure, the Professor was the
last man on the span. Even then, with the span tilting more than 28
feet up and down and twisting through an angle of more than 90 de
grees, the Professor was making scientific observations and recording
notes of the new and unexpected mode of motion that had developed,
with little or no anticipation of the imminent destruction of the bridge.
When the motion increased in violence, he made his way safely to the
side span by scientifically following the yellow line in the middle of
the roadway. He was one of the most surprised men when the span
he had left began to disintegrate to come crashing down into the Sound.
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One of the chief construction engineers, overwrought by the tragic
spectacle of the collapsing span, attempted to leap from the bridge after
the falling steelwork, but was restrained by his friends.
After the catastrophe, the toll gate at the end of the bridge was
barred with a sign marked “Closed”. A large sign near the bridge
approach advertised a local bank with the slogan “As Safe as the T a 
coma Bridge” ; the day after the bridge collapsed, that billboard was
taken down.
One of the insurance policies covering the bridge had been written
by a local agent who had pocketed the premium and had neglected to
report the policy, in the amount of $800,000, to his company. When he
later received his prison sentence, he pointed out that his embezzlement
would never have been discovered if the bridge had remained up but
another week, at which time the bridge authorities had planned to cancel
all of the policies.
T he amazing feature of the catastrophe was the confidence of the
bridge authorities in the safety of the structure and their failure to
apply adequate corrective measures before opening the bridge to traffic.
Tw o years earlier, a parallel situation had arisen when the phenom
enon of aerodynamic undulations had been discovered on another bridge;
in that case, however, prompt and effective corrective measures had
been devised and applied before the bridge was opened to traffic, and
the information had promptly been presented to the profession.
In the summer of 1938, when the Thousand Islands International
Bridge over the St. Lawrence River was approaching completion, pecu
liar undulations of the 800-ft. suspension span were observed under
certain conditions of a quartering wind. This was only a week or two
before the date scheduled for the official opening of the bridge and
its dedication by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie
King. The engineers had to make a critical decision. T o open the
bridge to traffic without first curing the strange, unexplained undula
tions was to them unthinkable. There remained but two alternatives:
One was to cancel the official dedication and keep the bridge closed
until the problem could be solved, and the other alternative was to find
a prompt solution of the problem and apply it before the opening date.
Applying their analysis and resourcefulness under emergency conditions,
the engineers devised corrective measures and promptly installed them.
These corrective measures consisted of mid-span guys anchoring girder
to cable at mid-span so as to stop relative longitudinal movement, and
end-span cable stays running from the ends of the girder to cable bands
near the quarter-points of the cable to check any building up of the
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critical oscillations of span and cables. These corrective devices were
hurriedly fashioned in temporary form out of 3/4-inch hoisting rope
borrowed from the contractor, and their installation was completed on
the morning of the opening day. They proved effective in stopping the
undulations of the span, and later were replaced with more rigid and
permanent installations. The information on the aerodynamic phenom
ena discovered and on their successful correction was promptly made
available to other bridge engineers through professional publications.
Shortly after the Tacoma Bridge was opened and its undulatory
behavior was reported in technical periodicals, the engineers of the
Thousand Islands Bridge communicated with the engineers of the
Tacoma span, offering the availability of their services and patents to
correct the undulations. This offer was not accepted. Three months
later the Tacoma span was wrecked by its undulations.
At the time, it had not been disclosed that the corrective measures
successfully applied on the Thousand Islands Bridge had been partially
followed on the Tacoma Bridge to the extent of installing mid-span
stays; but at Tacoma these mid-span stays were apparently inadequately
proportioned, besides being made of ropes resisting tension only instead
of being made of rigid braces, resisting both tension and compression, as
in the permanent installation at Thousand Islands. Moreover, the mid
span stays at Tacoma, without supplementary end-span stays to check
vertical motions and twisting, constituted only a half-way measure, not
a complete correction. In addition, at Tacoma, hydraulic buffers were
installed at the ends of the main span with the thought of damping
longitudinal motion, but these apparently were of little efficacy in stop
ping the undulations of the span. Under the land spans vertical hold
down ropes were installed, and these served to hold the side spans rela
tively firm (until the main span collapsed). W ith all these staying and
checking devices installed, but without the essential end-span stays, the
main span continued to heave in periodic waves of formidable magni
tude, and the traffic continued to be allowed over the structure. The
mid-span stays served to keep the vertical undulations, with node at
mid-span, from breaking into the more dangerous out-of-phase twisting
oscillations; without the mid-span stays, the bridge probably would not
have lasted as long as it did. On the morning of the failure, at 10 A. M.,
it appears that one of the mid-span stays at the south cable snapped,
throwing double strain and duty on the corresponding connection at
the mid-span point of the north cable; overloaded, the north cable band
began to slip, and this permitted the prior vertical heaving to change
suddenly into the catastrophic twisting motion that, during the ensuing
hour and ten minutes, wrecked the structure.
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During the weeks preceding the failure, Professor Farquharson
had made some wind-tunnel tests on a small-scale model of the crosssection of the Tacoma span. The lift-graph obtained in these wind
tunnel tests showed the downward or negative slope that is a character
istic of sections having “aerodynamic instability.” From such lift-graph,
as had been previously shown by Professor den Hartog, amplification of
vertical undulations can be predicted. The point that was missed, how
ever, was that the same wind-tunnel lift graph, by an extension of the
analysis, also predicts the development and amplification of the more
dangerous twisting oscillations. This would have been revealed even
more clearly if a torque graph had been recorded in the wind tunnel
tests.
In the same series of tests, Professor Farquharson studied various
methods of modifying the Tacoma cross-section so as to reduce its
vulnerability to the aerodynamic effects. One of these proposals was to
cut rows of large holes in the webs of the stiffening girders so as to
reduce their presented vertical area; but this would have involved weak
ening the section as designed. Another proposal was to affix circular
fairing in front of the windward girder so as to deflect the wind. In fact,
on the morning of the failure, the authorities were securing prices on
the material for such streamlining of the bridge. This proposal, how
ever, would have been of doubtful efficacy, especially if such fairing
were to be affixed to both girders in order to provide for wind from
either direction.
There are a number of economical ways in which the bridge could
have been made safe prior to the day of its failure, also a number of
emergency measures by which the structure could have been saved on
the morning of the failure.
During the investigations that followed the disaster, one of the
engineering experts retained by the insurance companies, Holton D.
Robinson, 78 years old, calmly walked out over the 17^-inch cables,
each 5900 ft. long and 450 feet high at each tower, to examine the
condition of the wires and to cut out samples of the wire at mid-span.
His feat was rendered more difficult and hazardous by the fact that the
hand-ropes in the main span had been wrecked. In the subsequent con
ference he was asked how much it would have cost to equip the Tacoma
bridge with cable stays such as had been used at Thousand Islands.
“Much less than the money that was spent on the laboratory model
studies,” was his reply.
The Tacoma Narrows Bridge was perfectly safe for all the loads
and forces for which it had been designed, namely dead load, live load,
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temperature, and static effect of wind load. In common with other
bridges, however, it had not been designed for the dynamic effect of
wind load. By this we mean the effect of a steady wind, acting on a
flexible structure of certain types of cross-section, to produce a fluctuat
ing resultant force automatically synchronizing in timing and direction
with the harmonic motions of the structure so as to cause a progressive
amplification of those motions to dangerous or destructive amplitudes.
On the morning of the Tacoma failure, the gale of 35 to 42 miles
an hour meant a wind pressure of only about 5 pounds per square foot.
The bridge had been designed for a wind pressure of 50 pounds per
square foot, and was structurally safe for a static wind load of 50 pounds
per square foot. It was destroyed however by the cumulative dynamic
effect of a wind pressure of 5 pounds per square foot.
This aerodynamic behavior of a bridge was not entirely unprece
dented. It had happened before, but the lesson had been missed by the
profession.
In 1848, Charles Ellett completed his greatest work, the suspension
bridge over the Ohio River at Wheeling with the record-breaking span
of 1010 feet. It was, at the time, the world’s longest span. Six years
later, on May 17, 1854, that great bridge was destroyed by the wind.
Technical publications recorded the disaster merely as another bridge
wrecked by a powerful storm, and the lesson was lost to the profession.
W e find the complete story of the disaster, however, in an eye-witness
account by a reporter, printed the following day in the “Wheeling
Intelligencer” and reprinted four days later in the “New York Times”.
A remarkable parallel to the Tacoma catastrophe is revealed by the fol
lowing excerpts from the original newspaper account (italics have been
supplied) :
W ith feelings of unutterable sorrow, we announce that the noble
and world-renowned structure, the Wheeling Suspension Bridge, has
been swept from its strongholds by a terrific storm, and now lies a
mass of ruins. Yesterday morning thousands beheld this stupendous
structure, a mighty pathway spanning the beautiful waters of the
Ohio, and looked upon it as one of the proudest monuments of the
enterprise of our citizens. Now, nothing remains of it but the dis
mantled towers looming above the sorrowful wreck that lies beneath
them.
About 3 o’clock yesterday we walked towards the Suspension
Bridge and went upon it, as we have frequently done, enjoying the
cool breeze and the undulating motion of the bridge . . . W e had
been off the flooring only two minutes, and were on Main street
when we saw persons running toward the river bank; we followed
just in time to see the whole structure heaving and dashing with tre
mendous force.
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For a few moments we watched it with breathless anxiety,
lunging like a ship in a storm; at one time it rose to nearly the
height of the tower, then fell, and twisted and writhed, and was
dashed almost bottom upward. At last there seemed to be a deter
mined twist along the entire span, about one-half of the flooring
being nearly reversed, and down went the immense structure from
its dizzy height to the stream below, with an appalling crash and
roar.
For a mechanical solution of the unexpected fall of this stupen
dous structure, we must await further developments. W e witnessed
the terrific scene. The great body of the flooring and the suspenders,
forming something like a basket swung between the towers, was
swayed to and fro like the motion of a pendulum. Each vibration
giving it increased momentum, the cables, which sustained the whole
structure, were unable to resist a force operating on them in so many
different directions, and were literally twisted and wrenched from
their fastenings. . . .
W e believe the enterprise and public spirit of our citizens will
repair the loss as speedily as any community could possibly do. It is
a source of gratulation that no lives were lost by the disaster.
The newspaper man who wrote the foregoing dramatic account un
knowingly summarized the crux of the aerodynamic phenomenon he
had observed when he used the significant phrase: “Each vibration giv
ing it increased momentum.” And when he stated that the mechanical
solution of the failure “must await further developments,” he wrote
better than he knew. In those days bridge builders were not thinking
in terms of aerodynamics, and the profession had to wait nearly 90 years
for the further developments that finally gave them an understanding
and mastery of the problem.
Even before the Wheeling Bridge disaster, a similar aerodynamic
destruction of a span had been recorded. On November 30th, 1836, one
of the spans of the Chain Pier at Brighton, England, was destroyed by
a storm. This was about three years before the invention of photog
raphy; but a scientific eye-witness has left us sketches recording, with
remarkable fidelity, the wave motions and the final collapse of the span.
This was Lieut. Col. Reid of the Royal Engineers, who was distin
guished for his researches on storms and who was later appointed Gov
ernor of Bermuda. In his two published drawings of the Brighton dis
aster the first sketch shows the sine-curve undulations of the span, in
two segments with node at mid-span. The second sketch shows one half
span breaking and falling into the sea. These drawings reveal a striking
similarity to the photographic views of the undulations and collapse of
the Tacoma Bridge. The parallel between the two bridge disasters is
further confirmed by the following excerpts from Col. Reid’s account
published in 1838 (italics supplied) :
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The same span of the Brighton chain-pier (the third from the
shore) has now twice given way in a storm. The first time it hap
pened in a dark night . . . This time, it gave way half an hour
after mid-day, on the 30th of November, 1836, and a great number
of persons were therefore enabled to see it. The upper one of the
two sketches annexed, shews the greatest degree of undulation it
arrived at before the road-way broke; and the under one shews its
state after it broke; but the great chains from which the road is
suspended remained entire. . . . The second and fourth spans
. . . also undulated greatly during the storm, but not in the same
degree of undulation of the third span. A movement of the same
kind in the roadway has always been sensibly felt by persons walking
on it in high winds; but on the 29th of November, 1836, the wind
had almost the same violence as in a tropical hurricane. . . . [N ote:
A. M . called November 29, P. M . called November 30— D. B. S.]
For a considerable time, the undulations of all the spans seemed
nearly equal. The gale became a storm about eleven o’clock in the
forenoon, and by noon it blew very hard. Up to this period many
persons from curiosity went across the first span, and a few were
seen at the further end; but soon after mid-day the lateral oscillations
of the third span increased to a degree to make it doubtful whether
the work could withstand the storm; and soon afterwards the oscil
lating motion across the roadway j seemed to the eye to be lost in
the undulating one; . . . the undulatory motion which was along
the length of the road is that which is shown in the first sketch;
but there was also an oscillating motion of the great chains across
the work, though the one seemed to destroy the other. . . . At
last the railing on the east side was seen to be breaking away, falling
into the sea; and immediately the undulations increased; and when
the railing on this side was nearly all gone, the undulations were
quite as great as represented in the drawing.
In the Transactions of the Royal Scottish Society of Arts, Vol. I,
1841, John Scott Russell, vice president of the Society, published a
paper entitled “On the Vibration of Suspension Bridges and other
Structures; and the Means of preventing Injury from this Cause.” In
this paper, published a hundred years ago, the author discussed “the
general nature of the vibrations that destroy suspension bridges and
other slender structures” ; he showed how the Brighton span failure
confirmed his prior investigations and predictions; and he recorded in
simple, logical form the elementary, fundamental principles of applying
systems of stays to break up the natural modes of harmonic motion of a
structure.
Thus, as far back as 1841, the basic, elementary principles involved
were already analyzed, tested, and recorded. A century later, at great
price, bridge engineers had to learn the lesson over again. Let us resolve
that this time the lesson, in its full significance, will be clearly and em
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phatically impressed upon all future bridge engineers, so that this kind of
bridge failure shall never occur again.
This narrative of the unfortunate Tacoma Bridge catastrophe would
not be complete without a sincere tribute to the eminent designing engi
neer of that great span, and to his prior distinguished contributions to
the science and art of suspension bridge design. The span failure is
not to be blamed on him; the entire profession shares in the respon
sibility. It is simply that the profession had neglected to combine, and
apply in time, the knowledge of aerodynamics and of dynamic vibra
tions with its rapidly advancing knowledge and development of struc
tural design.
The Tacoma Narrows Bridge represents the culmination of a trend
in bridge design. A century ago, bridge engineers began to realize that
suspension bridges needed stiffening to reduce deflections under load
and to prevent destruction by wind. Stiffening trusses and stays were
introduced by John A. Roebling and his contemporaries. Subsequent
stiffening trusses were made deeper and deeper, reaching a climax in the
obviously excessive and clumsy proportions of the Williamsburg Bridge
completed in 1903. Thereafter the trend was reversed. The introduc
tion of the “Deflection Theory” for suspension bridge design revealed
that prior spans had been proportioned with needlessly excessive depth
and section, and placed a premium of economy on more flexible design.
Increased emphasis on artistic appearance placed a further premium on
grace and slenderness. Stiffening trusses were made of shallower and
shallower depth. Towers were reduced to more and more slender and
flexible design. Then, commencing about 1929, with such effective
examples as the 1033-ft. span of the Cologne-Muhlheim Bridge over
the Rhine, the use of stiffening girders instead of trusses acquired in
creasing application, resulting in maximum artistic simplicity of line.
Thus improvement in analysis, the demands of economy, and considera
tions of aesthetics— all combined to accelerate the trend toward in
creased slenderness of proportions.
About 1935, considerable thought and study were given to develop
ing a specification for the necessary minimum stiffness of suspension
spans. Formulas and graphs were devised for rating the comparative
rigidities, but there appeared to be no way of establishing a proper cri
terion of satisfactory stiffness. W here should the line be drawn to sepa
rate adequate from inadequate coefficients of rigidity? How far could
we safely go? The answer to this question was lacking. N ow we have
the answer. Four bridges completed in 1938 and 1939 have rigidity
coefficients below a certain value; these four spans have given some
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trouble under aerodynamic action, and have required stays to check their
undulations. Then came the Tacoma Narrows Bridge completed in
1940; this span had a still lower coefficient of stiffness, and it succumbed
to the effects of its extreme flexibility. Hence now we know where to
draw the line: below a certain measure of stiffness, we may expect
some difficulties requiring corrective measures; and if we go below a
still lower indicated stiffness ratio, we may expect disaster.
Such is the price we pay for progress. The great advances of the
human race have been won by those who showed the courage to go
beyond the charted course. It is only in such manner that new knowl
edge can be gained—that new progress can be achieved. When progress
is rapid, we may expect to stumble. The test of M an is that he profits
by his experience and continues onward, with new wisdom and knowl
edge, toward still greater enterprise and achievement.

